In conclusion, the problem of luck in humanaction has been a dominant theme inmajority of philosophy cases. I argue that Nagel has a valid theory and I am in acceptance of hisdefinition for constitutive moral luck. Overall, when evaluating the principles Moral Luck, it stems from a faulty understanding of theconditions of moral accountability. Some people don’t even believe in luck so it’s up to one’s discretion if they think Nagel’s attempt to instruct us on moral luck isenoughto make them believers or not. My perspective to Nagel’s four ways of moral luck is strong and believable. I am familiar with a lotof individuals who have committed crimes.
Majority of them where raised up inlow income settings, shattered homes and raised in bad circumstances where allthey perceived was crime and most of them ended out to be criminals in societydo to seeing nothing but crime being committed in the environment they were being brought up in,therefore they recognized nothing else but what they understood or was taught. their environment playeda big part in how they developed and who they became. I also agree with Nagel claiming movements that are involuntary,are typically never blamable. If I wasat gunpoint, and forced to rob the bank and threatened that if I don’t I will lose my life, I should not be at fault for myactions of wanting to save my life, or should I be at blame for robbing the bankbecause I was forced to do it, the act would be considered involuntary. The laws may object andsay I was in the wrong, but being detained against my own will and having noother opportunities, or control over the circumstances, I should not be heldaccountable. outburst and using bad language. He is not responsible for hisactions because it is involuntary and brought on due to his disability. How ishe responsible if he is not in control? he can’t be blamed for his actions that are not underhis control by will but what can only be blamed is the turrets syndrome for his actions.
What is the most fundamental way in which we shouldevaluate moral judgments? Nagel brings to theattention that “the view that moral luck is paradoxical is not a mistake,ethical, or logical, but a perception of one of the ways in which theintuitively acceptable conditions of moral judgement threaten to undermine itall” (Colorado). Katians theory on moralluck “this view seems to be wrong, but arises in response to a fundamentalproblem about moral responsibility to which we possess no satisfactorysolution”. (Colorado). In part, Nagel replies to Katiansthought “this view is too simple and doesn’t consider the way external factorsimpinge upon us” (Colorado). Should we take accountability and not reflexively agree to take concidentialcondition? We act when it derives to uncertainties, and the probableconsequences must count in the moral assessment of it. Someone who’s missionand intent are to shoot and kill but due to missing the person, is in the equalmoral position as the one who shoots, does not miss, and kills.
The concern about Moral Luck is controlprinciple. Control principle is the idea that moral judgement should only bepractical in situations where people take freedom in their actions and onlythen, to the degree that they are able to determine the consequence. “The problem of moralluck arises because we seem to be committed to the principle that we aremorally assessed for depends on factors under our control” (Plato). Constitutive moral luckis how moral one is and can be subject to one’s character qualities, even if one’s character qualities aredue to factors past one’s control.
For instance, though criminals appear worse than upstandingpeople, it’s reasonable tocontemplate that whether one is a violent criminal, or an upstanding citizendepends on one’s genetic factor, and the setting in which one is raised up. Ifthat’s accurate, then someone is a violent criminal or upstanding due to thefactors outside her or his control. In answer, there are individuals who wouldhave us reject the control principle to reserve the method we practice, andthose who would have us adjust the way we practice moral duty to reservecontrol principle. As Nagel explains, movements that are involuntary, are typically neverblamable. To set an example, I have a nephew who is currently diagnosed with the turrets syndrome. on several occasions hehas been known for having Moral Luck is a when a moral agent is given praise or fault for an action or even itsconsequences no matter if an agent had complete control over either the consequences oractions. Nagel expresses that there are four ways in which moral evaluation is conditional to luck and they are constitutional luck: the kind of person you are, and not what you intentionally do but of your disposition. Circumstantial luck: the kind of difficultiesthat one can face or a situation.
Consequential Luck: in which the consequences affect the kind of quality of a fault, remorse, or justify any other kind of immortal act. American Philosopher Thomas Nagel, has spent time examining a forthcoming with a theory aboutmoral luck. His main attention consists of studying and evaluating philosophy of mind, ethics and political philosophy.Nagel identifies four ways in which luck centers a part in moral duty. He raises the barwith the questionofwhether luck can affect judgement of morality. I argue that Nagel’s theory of Moral Luck is substantial and one that has all the basic groundings for Me to believe its precise. His idea was driver A and B were both drunk driving home, driver A passed the red lightstriking a child in the road killing the child while driver B made it home safe.
InNagel viewpoint, this kind of luck affects in the case of if an individual will be justified or not. One way to evaluate moral standingsis by making sure the act is associated in the right way to its agents or it will be inerror. In brief, Moral Luck stems from a faulty understanding of the conditions of moralaccountability.