On day four, Prime Minister Begin still considered his outside options more convenient than President Sadat’s proposal.
President Carter, then decided to reveal him that Sadat, who was trying to establish a relationship of trust with him, confessed him that the adoption of an hard position was only a tactic to give Begin the impression of a smaller zone of agreement and thus to persuade him into making concessions; in fact, the points he proposed was not to be considered his final ones, since he even suggested some modifications that Carter could propose during private sessions with the Israeli Prime Minister. In response to this, Begin adopted an even more inflexible position as far as the Sinai settlements were concerned (Quandt, 1986). His strategy, in fact, consisted in appearing concerned on this issue to draw focus away from the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the City of Jerusalem, areas very important to him; as long as Sadat didn’t drop his demands on such territories, Begin would exert pressure on him, without making any concession on the thing most important to him, the Sinai. However, unlike Sadat, Begin, deeply distrusted the other actors involved, included Carter, thus, he had no intention of revealing his intellectual line of action (Fisher and Ury, 2011). By day five, the United States started to develop an American proposal, in which the problem about Gaza and West Bank were arbitrary avoided, due to the fact that it could be a misleading topic (Quandt, 1986).
On day six, the proposal was presented to the leaders, who would be given time to suggest potential changes. However, Begin still kept sticking to his position. Consequently, by day ten, failure appeared imminent: no solution seemed to exist to the structural and complete deadlock Carter was presented with; to worsen the situation, on the eleventh day, the sudden threat of Sadat to abandon the negotiations, came up to the ears of Carter. The latter immediately confronted Sadat and managed to overcome the deadlock by warning and threatening him that if he left “it will mean first of all an end to the relationship between the United States and Egypt” (Brzezinski, 1983). The deadline effect triggered by Carter, forced President Sadat to chose between his relations with the United States and his relations with other Arab states; he decided to chose the former. On day twelve, Begin encountered Carter for a crucial session, in which a compromise solution was finally reached. Two separate agreements were drafted; the first one concerning the withdrawal of Israel from Sinai, and the second one arranging future negotiations, thus avoiding the one-shot game incentive structure and promoting the respect of the agreement stipulated. Finally, Carter managed to transform a distributive bargaining situation into an integrative one by focusing on the interests of the negotiators; thus, the Israeli win-set found correspondence with the Egyptian one.
On the thirteenth day, September 17, an agreement was reached. Carter allowed the two leaders to change their perception of the negotiation process from a zero-sum game towards a perception of the agreement as beneficial to all parties involved.