SYSTEMANALYSISEXISTING SYSTEM:v Thedata provenance methodology, in the form of robust watermarking techniques oradding fake data, has already been suggested in the literature and employed bysome industries.v Hasanet al. present a system that enforces logging of read and write actions in atamper-proof provenance chain.
This creates the possibility of verifying theorigin of information in a document.v Pohaddresses the problem of accountable data transfer with untrusted senders usingthe term fair content tracing. He presents a general framework to comparedifferent approaches and splits protocols into four categories depending ontheir utilization of trusted third parties, i.e., no trusted third parties,offline trusted third parties, online trusted third parties and trustedhardware. Furthermore, he introduces the additional properties of recipientanonymity and fairness in association with payment.
DISADVANTAGESOF EXISTING SYSTEM:v Insome cases, identification of the leaker is made possible by forensictechniques, but these are usually expensive and do not always generate thedesired results.v Mostefforts have been ad-hoc in nature and there is no formal model available.v Additionally,most of these approaches only allow identification of the leaker in anon-provable manner, which is not sufficient in many cases.v Anattacker is able to strip of the provenance information of a file, the problemof data leakage in malicious environments is not tackled by their approach. PROPOSED SYSTEM:v Wepoint out the need for a general accountability mechanism in data transfers.This accountability can be directly associated with provably detecting atransmission history of data across multiple entities starting from its origin.This is known as data provenance, data lineage or source tracing.v Inthis paper, we formalize this problem of provably associating the guilty partyto the leakages, and work on the data lineage methodologies to solve theproblem of information leakage in various leakage scenarios.
v Thissystem defines LIME, a generic data lineage framework for data flow acrossmultiple entities in the malicious environment. v Weobserve that entities in data flows assume one of two roles: owner or consumer.We introduce an additional role in the form of auditor, whose task is todetermine a guilty party for any data leak, and define the exact properties forcommunication between these roles. v Inthe process, we identify an optional non-repudiation assumption made betweentwo owners, and an optional trust (honesty) assumption made by the auditorabout the owners.
v Asour second contribution, we present an accountable data transfer protocol toverifiably transfer data between two entities. To deal with an untrusted senderand an untrusted receiver scenario associated with data transfer between twoconsumers, our protocols employ an interesting combination of the robustwatermarking, oblivious transfer, and signature primitives. ADVANTAGESOF PROPOSED SYSTEM:v Thekey advantage of our model is that it enforces accountability by design; i.
e.,it drives the system designer to consider possible data leakages and thecorresponding accountability constraints at the design stage. This helps toovercome the existing situation where most lineage mechanisms are applied onlyafter a leakage has happened.v Weprove its correctness and show that it is realizable by giving microbenchmarking results. By presenting a general applicable framework, weintroduce accountability as early as in the design phase of a data transfer infrastructure.