The current law on assisted suicide criminalizes any

The current law on assisted suicide
criminalizes any individual who assists or encourages someone else to commit
suicide This was confirmed in Lord Neuberger’s judgement in R (Nicklinson) v
Ministry of Justice and R. (on the application of AM) v Director of Public
Prosecutions? which raised
controversial views condemning the courts approach as being intentionally limited
to develop the law on assisted to suicide.  Nevertheless, this essay aims to argue
that the view that the judiciary are not taking all necessary measures to
change moral based laws is only true to a certain extent. The principle issues
that will be discussed in this paper is whether judicial review judges are
utilizing a misconception of democracy to abstain from choosing important legal
issues in this case assisted suicide. The second issue is whether they are wrongly
proceeding on the basis that these issues are not matters for the courts rather
for the parliament.  In this case, terminally
ill Tony Nicklinson attempted but failed in various legal actions to challenge
the current law on assisted suicide as he wanted a doctor to help him end his
own life Following his death due
to voluntary starvation, his wife Jane joined by Mr. Lamb who is also
terminally ill in this case appealed this decision to the supreme court. The law sustained
challenge from the complainants on the justification that it fails to comply
with certain requirements of the European Convention on human rights.  At this stage of
this case the claimants Nicklinson and Lamb both claim that the court of appeal
had erred in not declaring the current Suicide Act incompatible with articles 8
and 14 of the European Convention on Human rights. Although, by a majority
judgement the supreme court dismissed their appeals and refused to issue a
declaration on the grounds that it lies within the margin of appreciate granted
by the ECHR to convention states. However dissenting judges believed that a
declaration was necessary as a constitutional role of the domestic courts to protect
the rights of the individuals. As a result of
such approach, Nicklinson brought an argument before ECtHR that this is an
ultimate breach of convention rights specifically stating article 8. Although, It
was declared inadmissible due to the drawn conclusions that this provision does
not impose procedural obligations on the domestic courts to examine the
benefits of a challenge in regards to Acts of parliament. Thus, if this were to
happen it would amount to imposing upon them a constitutional role that is not envisaged
by the constitutional order. Therefore, it would be peculiar to deny that the
courts will eventually come to the conclusion , similar to Strasbourg court that
parliament is the ultimate decision maker in moral and social issues. It can be
suggested that the Supreme Court judges who went against declaration of
incompatibility in issues where moral arguments arise, had the right to show
deference, and reestablished the point that if they choose not to use such
power it will not amount to a breach of convention.